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// Copyright 2019 Developers of the Rand project. // // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE or // https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license // <LICENSE-MIT or https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your // option. This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed // except according to those terms. //! Interface to the operating system's random number generator. //! //! # Supported targets //! //! | Target | Target Triple | Implementation //! | ----------------- | ------------------ | -------------- //! | Linux, Android | `*‑linux‑*` | [`getrandom`][1] system call if available, otherwise [`/dev/urandom`][2] after successfully polling `/dev/random` | //! | Windows | `*‑windows‑*` | [`BCryptGenRandom`][3] | //! | macOS | `*‑apple‑darwin` | [`getentropy()`][19] if available, otherwise [`/dev/random`][20] (identical to `/dev/urandom`) //! | iOS | `*‑apple‑ios` | [`SecRandomCopyBytes`][4] //! | FreeBSD | `*‑freebsd` | [`getrandom()`][21] if available, otherwise [`kern.arandom`][5] //! | OpenBSD | `*‑openbsd` | [`getentropy`][6] //! | NetBSD | `*‑netbsd` | [`kern.arandom`][7] //! | Dragonfly BSD | `*‑dragonfly` | [`/dev/random`][8] //! | Solaris, illumos | `*‑solaris`, `*‑illumos` | [`getrandom()`][9] if available, otherwise [`/dev/random`][10] //! | Fuchsia OS | `*‑fuchsia` | [`cprng_draw`][11] //! | Redox | `*‑redox` | [`rand:`][12] //! | Haiku | `*‑haiku` | `/dev/random` (identical to `/dev/urandom`) //! | SGX | `x86_64‑*‑sgx` | [RDRAND][18] //! | VxWorks | `*‑wrs‑vxworks‑*` | `randABytes` after checking entropy pool initialization with `randSecure` //! | Emscripten | `*‑emscripten` | `/dev/random` (identical to `/dev/urandom`) //! | WASI | `wasm32‑wasi` | [`__wasi_random_get`][17] //! | Web Browser | `wasm32‑*‑unknown` | [`Crypto.getRandomValues()`][14], see [WebAssembly support][16] //! | Node.js | `wasm32‑*‑unknown` | [`crypto.randomBytes`][15], see [WebAssembly support][16] //! //! There is no blanket implementation on `unix` targets that reads from //! `/dev/urandom`. This ensures all supported targets are using the recommended //! interface and respect maximum buffer sizes. //! //! Pull Requests that add support for new targets to `getrandom` are always welcome. //! //! ## Unsupported targets //! //! By default, `getrandom` will not compile on unsupported targets, but certain //! features allow a user to select a "fallback" implementation if no supported //! implementation exists. //! //! All of the below mechanisms only affect unsupported //! targets. Supported targets will _always_ use their supported implementations. //! This prevents a crate from overriding a secure source of randomness //! (either accidentally or intentionally). //! //! ### RDRAND on x86 //! //! *If the `"rdrand"` Cargo feature is enabled*, `getrandom` will fallback to using //! the [`RDRAND`][18] instruction to get randomness on `no_std` `x86`/`x86_64` //! targets. This feature has no effect on other CPU architectures. //! //! ### WebAssembly support //! //! This crate fully supports the //! [`wasm32-wasi`](https://github.com/CraneStation/wasi) and //! [`wasm32-unknown-emscripten`](https://www.hellorust.com/setup/emscripten/) //! targets. However, the `wasm32-unknown-unknown` target is not automatically //! supported since, from the target name alone, we cannot deduce which //! JavaScript interface is in use (or if JavaScript is available at all). //! //! Instead, *if the `"js"` Cargo feature is enabled*, this crate will assume //! that you are building for an environment containing JavaScript, and will //! call the appropriate methods. Both web browser (main window and Web Workers) //! and Node.js environments are supported, invoking the methods //! [described above](#supported-targets) using the //! [wasm-bindgen](https://github.com/rust-lang/rust-bindgen) toolchain. //! //! This feature has no effect on targets other than `wasm32-unknown-unknown`. //! //! ### Custom implementations //! //! The [`register_custom_getrandom!`] macro allows a user to mark their own //! function as the backing implementation for [`getrandom`]. See the macro's //! documentation for more information about writing and registering your own //! custom implementations. //! //! Note that registering a custom implementation only has an effect on targets //! that would otherwise not compile. Any supported targets (including those //! using `"rdrand"` and `"js"` Cargo features) continue using their normal //! implementations even if a function is registered. //! //! ### Indirect Dependencies //! //! If `getrandom` is not a direct dependency of your crate, you can still //! enable any of the above fallback behaviors by enabling the relevant //! feature in your root crate's `Cargo.toml`: //! ```toml //! [dependencies] //! getrandom = { version = "0.2", features = ["js"] } //! ``` //! //! ## Early boot //! //! Sometimes, early in the boot process, the OS has not collected enough //! entropy to securely seed its RNG. This is especially common on virtual //! machines, where standard "random" events are hard to come by. //! //! Some operating system interfaces always block until the RNG is securely //! seeded. This can take anywhere from a few seconds to more than a minute. //! A few (Linux, NetBSD and Solaris) offer a choice between blocking and //! getting an error; in these cases, we always choose to block. //! //! On Linux (when the `getrandom` system call is not available), reading from //! `/dev/urandom` never blocks, even when the OS hasn't collected enough //! entropy yet. To avoid returning low-entropy bytes, we first poll //! `/dev/random` and only switch to `/dev/urandom` once this has succeeded. //! //! ## Error handling //! //! We always choose failure over returning insecure "random" bytes. In general, //! on supported platforms, failure is highly unlikely, though not impossible. //! If an error does occur, then it is likely that it will occur on every call to //! `getrandom`, hence after the first successful call one can be reasonably //! confident that no errors will occur. //! //! [1]: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/getrandom.2.html //! [2]: http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man4/urandom.4.html //! [3]: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/bcrypt/nf-bcrypt-bcryptgenrandom //! [4]: https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/1399291-secrandomcopybytes?language=objc //! [5]: https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=random&sektion=4 //! [6]: https://man.openbsd.org/getentropy.2 //! [7]: https://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?sysctl+7+NetBSD-8.0 //! [8]: https://leaf.dragonflybsd.org/cgi/web-man?command=random§ion=4 //! [9]: https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E88353_01/html/E37841/getrandom-2.html //! [10]: https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E86824_01/html/E54777/random-7d.html //! [11]: https://fuchsia.dev/fuchsia-src/zircon/syscalls/cprng_draw //! [12]: https://github.com/redox-os/randd/blob/master/src/main.rs //! [14]: https://www.w3.org/TR/WebCryptoAPI/#Crypto-method-getRandomValues //! [15]: https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#crypto_crypto_randombytes_size_callback //! [16]: #webassembly-support //! [17]: https://github.com/WebAssembly/WASI/blob/master/design/WASI-core.md#__wasi_random_get //! [18]: https://software.intel.com/en-us/articles/intel-digital-random-number-generator-drng-software-implementation-guide //! [19]: https://www.unix.com/man-page/mojave/2/getentropy/ //! [20]: https://www.unix.com/man-page/mojave/4/random/ //! [21]: https://www.freebsd.org/cgi/man.cgi?query=getrandom&manpath=FreeBSD+12.0-stable #![doc( html_logo_url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/logos/rust-logo-128x128-blk.png", html_favicon_url = "https://www.rust-lang.org/favicon.ico", html_root_url = "https://docs.rs/getrandom/0.2.2" )] #![no_std] #![warn(rust_2018_idioms, unused_lifetimes, missing_docs)] #![cfg_attr(docsrs, feature(doc_cfg))] #[macro_use] extern crate cfg_if; mod error; mod util; // To prevent a breaking change when targets are added, we always export the // register_custom_getrandom macro, so old Custom RNG crates continue to build. #[cfg(feature = "custom")] mod custom; #[cfg(feature = "std")] mod error_impls; pub use crate::error::Error; // System-specific implementations. // // These should all provide getrandom_inner with the same signature as getrandom. cfg_if! { if #[cfg(any(target_os = "dragonfly", target_os = "emscripten", target_os = "haiku", target_os = "redox"))] { mod util_libc; #[path = "use_file.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(any(target_os = "android", target_os = "linux"))] { mod util_libc; mod use_file; #[path = "linux_android.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(any(target_os = "illumos", target_os = "solaris"))] { mod util_libc; mod use_file; #[path = "solaris_illumos.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(any(target_os = "freebsd", target_os = "netbsd"))] { mod util_libc; #[path = "bsd_arandom.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(target_os = "fuchsia")] { #[path = "fuchsia.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(target_os = "ios")] { #[path = "ios.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(target_os = "macos")] { mod util_libc; mod use_file; #[path = "macos.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(target_os = "openbsd")] { mod util_libc; #[path = "openbsd.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(target_os = "wasi")] { #[path = "wasi.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(target_os = "vxworks")] { mod util_libc; #[path = "vxworks.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(windows)] { #[path = "windows.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(all(target_arch = "x86_64", target_env = "sgx"))] { #[path = "rdrand.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(all(feature = "rdrand", any(target_arch = "x86_64", target_arch = "x86")))] { #[path = "rdrand.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(all(feature = "js", target_arch = "wasm32", target_os = "unknown"))] { #[path = "js.rs"] mod imp; } else if #[cfg(feature = "custom")] { use custom as imp; } else { compile_error!("target is not supported, for more information see: \ https://docs.rs/getrandom/#unsupported-targets"); } } /// Fill `dest` with random bytes from the system's preferred random number /// source. /// /// This function returns an error on any failure, including partial reads. We /// make no guarantees regarding the contents of `dest` on error. If `dest` is /// empty, `getrandom` immediately returns success, making no calls to the /// underlying operating system. /// /// Blocking is possible, at least during early boot; see module documentation. /// /// In general, `getrandom` will be fast enough for interactive usage, though /// significantly slower than a user-space CSPRNG; for the latter consider /// [`rand::thread_rng`](https://docs.rs/rand/*/rand/fn.thread_rng.html). pub fn getrandom(dest: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), Error> { if dest.is_empty() { return Ok(()); } imp::getrandom_inner(dest) }